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Terminating the Israel-PLO Declaration
of Principles: Is It Legal Under
International Law?
JEFFREY WEISS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) made history when they executed the
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrange-
ments (DOP). The DOP, as its title suggests, sets forth basic
principles for future talks between Israel and the PLO. These
negotiations are to decide the final status of territories, other than
the Golan Heights, controlled by Israel since the 1967 Six Day
War. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Foreign
Minister Shimon Peres, and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat received
the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts on the DOP agreement.'
Negotiated in secret, the peace plans as outlined in the DOP
elicited hostility both from Israel's conservative Likud bloc and
from opposition elements among the Palestinians. Subsequent
developments poured fuel on the controversy, until it finally
erupted November 4, 1995. On that day, an Israeli Jewish gunman
opposing the peace process assassinated Israeli Prime Minister
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areas of international law, commercial litigation and intellectual property. LL.M, with
honors, in International and Comparative Law, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D.,
magna cum laude, Arizona State University College of Law; Bar Ilan School of Law,
Israel. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Jonathan Strum.
1. Arafat's receipt of the peace prize generated substantial controversy within Israel.
Sarah Honig, Peres Joins Rabin and Arafat as Nobel Prize Winner, JERUSALEM POST, Oct.
16, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (describing Israeli
domestic opposition to Rabin's and Peres's decision to accept the award with Arafat).
Indeed, the Nobel committee found itself in conflict over this issue. Minutes after the
committee announced the award, one of its members, Kaare Kristiansen, resigned to
protest the choice of Arafat as a co-recipient. Id.
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Rabin, the man seen as the DOP's chief architect.2 From the
inception of the peace process with the PLO, Likud-affiliated
Knesset members intimated a willingness to disown the DOP,
should their party win Israel's next election. Indeed, Likud leader
Binyamin Netanyahu later announced that the Likud Party, if
elected, would move to freeze the peace process.' Before the
assassination of Rabin, Israel's Labour-led government had
expressed reservations over the DOP, notably, in response to
increased violence against Israelis. Before his death, Prime
Minister Rabin repeatedly delayed redeployment of Israeli forces
in the territories, contrary to the DOP's contemplated course.4
Following the tragedy in Tel Aviv, observers are asking whether
Shimon Peres, who succeeded Rabin as Prime Minister, but who
lacks his predecessor's popular credibility on security issues, can
marshal the broad support needed to continue what Rabin began.'
Faced with a chance that this or, more likely, a future Israeli
government could move to suspend or even terminate Israeli
performance under the DOP, the question arises: How would
international law view such an action? The first step in the
analysis is to characterize the DOP as a matter of international
law. If the DOP is a binding bilateral agreement between subjects
of international law, any Israeli cancellation of that agreement
should comport with international law governing treaty ter-
mination, to wit, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
If, on the other hand, the DOP's status falls short of an agreement
between two subjects of international law, the Vienna Convention
would not apply. Between these two extremes lies a middle road:
2. Serge Schmemann, Rabin Is Slain at a Peace Rally in Tel Aviv; Israeli Extremists
Make Claim for Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1995, at Al.
3. Christopher Walker, Threat to PLO Deal by Likud, THE TIMES (London), Mar.
3, 1995 ("Outlining what could happen after next year's general election if he comes to
power, Netanyahu said Israel would break off talks with the PLO, reinstitute the right of
'hot pursuit' into Gaza and Jericho and offer the Palestinians a new form of autonomy
limited to municipal affairs."); Martin Sieff, Likud Leader Hits PLO, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
7, 1995, at A13. Netanyahu has reaffirmed his opposition to the Israel-PLO agreement
since the Rabin assassination. Binyamin Netanyahu, McCarthyism in Tel Aviv, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at A19.
4. According to one published report, Rabin believed that the agreement may suffer
from a 'logical flaw' regarding the requirement that Israeli troops redeploy before
Palestinian elections. Barton Gellman, Israel Weighs Changes in Peace Accord, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 1994, at Al, A3.
5. Serge Schmemann, For New Leader Shouldering the Job, Huge Task and an
Uneasy Mandate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at A7.
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although an agreement between subjects of international law, the
parties never intended the DOP to bind them fully, envisioning it
instead as an "agreement to agree." This Article examines the
international legal prospects and consequences of each alternative.
II. NEGOTIATION AND RATIFICATION OF THE DOP
Israel and the PLO concluded the DOP on August 20, 1993.6
The agreement's signing followed several years of negotiation
between Israel and the PLO dating back to October 1991 and the
Madrid Conference.7 Initially, the PLO was not a direct partici-
pant in the Madrid Conference talks with Israel. Direct talks
between the PLO and Israel issued from secret negotiations in
Norway, culminating in the DOP agreement.8
The 1978 Camp David accords first addressed many of the
DOP's ideas.9 The Camp David agreements contemplated full
autonomy for the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
withdrawal of the Israeli military government upon the territories'
residents' election of a self-governing authority, deployment of a
Palestinian police force, and a five-year transitional period leading
to resolution of the final status of the territories."° Each of these
ideas reappears in similar form in the DOE"
On September 9, 1993, following agreement on the terms of
the DOP, Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of recognition.
For its part, the PLO recognized "the right of the State of Israel
to exist in peace and security," accepted United Nations (U.N.)
6. See JOHN KING, HANDSHAKE IN WASHINGTON 125 (1994). Formal execution of
the DOP did not take place, however, until September 13, 1993, in Washington, D.C.;
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-
PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter DOP].
7. Warren Christopher, Speech Delivered on the Signing of the Israel-PLO Accord,
in ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTER, DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-
GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS 13 (1993) [hereinafter ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTER].
8. See Clyde Haberman, How Oslo Helped Mold the Mideast Pact; The Secret Peace,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1993, at Al. For a thorough discussion of the Oslo process, see KING,
supra note 6; JANE CORBIN, GAZA FIRST 6 (1994).
9. Prime Minister Rabin referred to the link between the DOP and the Camp David
accords in an address to the Knesset shortly after announcing the DOP agreement. See
generally DOP, supra note 6. See also Raja Shihadeh, Can the Declaration of Principles
Bring About a "Just and Lasting Peace?", 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 555, 556 (1993).
10. See A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David, Isr.-Egypt,
Sept. 17, 1978, 1136 U.N.T.S. 196 [hereinafter A Framework for Peace].
11. See DOP, supra note 6.
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Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and committed itself "to
a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides.,
12
These aspects of the PLO's agreement did not break new ground;
in opening an exchange with the United States, the PLO previous-
ly had made similar promises.1 3  Nevertheless, the PLO's letter
did contain one new item that was a clear response to an oft-
repeated Israeli demand. According to Arafat's September 9
letter:
In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the
Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance
of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms
that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny
Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which
are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now
inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO
undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for
formal approval the necessary changes regarding the Palestinian
Covenant.14
For its part, and "in light of the commitments" in Arafat's
September 9 letter, Israel recognized the PLO "as the
representative of the Palestinian people."' 5  Significantly, howev-
12. ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 7, at 38.
13. In December 1988, Arafat promised each of these things in order to achieve an
official, open dialogue with the United States. KING, supra note 6, at 58. That dialogue
ended when the PLO refused to repudiate a PLO terrorist attack against Israel. Id.; see
also Elaine Sciolino, Washington to Restart Talks with PLO, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993,
at A14.
14. ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 7, at 38. In a second letter dated
September 9, 1993, addressed to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Hoist, Arafat
confirmed that in his public statements, he would call upon the Palestinians to reject
violence and terrorism. Id. at 40. Evidence shows that, from the very beginning, Israel
did not expect the PLO to actually obtain formal approval from the Palestinian National
Council of the changes in the Palestinian Covenant. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister Rabin
Defends the Israel-PLO Accord, Address to Labour Knesset Faction (Kol Yisrael radio
broadcast, Sept. 9, 1993), in PEACE WATCH, THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS AND
U.S. POLICY, DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, JANUARY 1993-MARCH 1994, at 84,85 (Judith
Wrubel ed., 1994) [hereinafter. PEACE WATCH]. Referring to Yasser Arafat's September
9, 1993 letter to Israel, Prime Minister Rabin said,
[Tihis is a commitment to carry the change in the PNC, because Clause 33 of the
Palestinian Covenant states that only a two-thirds majority of the PNC can
change the Covenant. I am not convinced that the party that is making the
arrangement with us enjoys such a majority in the PNC. This is the same PNC
that approved, albeit not unanimously, the Madrid Conference ....
Id.
15. ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 7, at 39.
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er, Israel did not recognize the PLO, in the manner historically
preferred by PLO supporters, as the "sole representative" of the
Palestinians.
t6
The text of the DOP remained a closely guarded secret until
after its execution in Washington, D.C. Indeed, as of September
9, 1993, the day that the Knesset began debating the DOP and
only four days before the signing ceremony, the Israeli government
had ,not yet released the text of the DOP to either the Israeli
opposition or members of the ruling coalition without cabinet
status. 7 The Labour government's failure to consult with the
opposition may have contributed to some of the apparent inconsis-
tencies in the DOP18
Even before the parties executed the DOP, some within the
Likud discussed whether provisionally to disclaim any international
obligations to the PLO that the Labour-led government had
created.19 During the Knesset debate, Likud leader Binyamin
16. See, e.g., PLO Executive Committee Statement on Accord, (Algiers Voice of
Palestine radio broadcast, Sept. 12, 1993), in PEACE WATCH, supra note 14, at 91
[hereinafter PLO Statement] ("The PLO has arrived at the first agreement in our contem-
porary history with Israel that ensures the recognition of the legitimate rights of our
Palestinian people and the Palestinian Liberation Organization as its sole representative.").
17. Dan Izenberg, Knesset to Debate Still-Secret "Gaza/Jericho First" Agreement,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File. The
government may have concealed the DOP from the opposition because it recognized that
the opposition parties would contest the DOP in any event. It is interesting in this regard
to contrast Menachem Begin's handling of the Camp David accords with Yitzhak Rabin's
handling of the DOP. Before departing for the conference at Camp David, Begin met
with Labour leader Shimon Peres to report on the positions the Israeli delegation would
present at Camp David. YAACOV BAR-SIMAN-TOV, ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS,
1977-1982: IN SEARCH OF LEGITIMACY FOR PEACE 111 (1994). While Begin's preparatory
work did not prevent Peres from criticizing the extent of Begin's concessions at Camp
David, the Labour and opposition parties overwhelmingly supported the Camp David
accords. Id at 147-48. See also MOSHE DAYAN, BREAKTHROUGH: A PERSONAL
ACCOUNT OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 193-94 (1981).
18. For example, the DOP appears to set up both a transitional period, beginning with
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Jericho and the Gaza Strip, and an interim period,
beginning with establishment of an elected Palestinian Council for the territories. Each
phase triggers critical deadlines in the DOP. See generally DOP, supra note 6, at arts. V
and VI. For a discussion of the DOP's transitional and interim periods, see infra note 56.
Additionally, the DOP provides for initial redeployment of Israeli forces in the West Bank
and Gaza before elections for the Palestinian Council. Prime Minister Rabin may have
believed this provision incapable of being fulfilled. See Gellman, supra note 4. One
wonders whether prior review by opposition members may have led to timely clarification
of'these issues before the DOP took effect.
19. Dan Izenberg, Knesset Okays Accord With PLO, 61-50: Vote Gives Rabin
"Freedom of Action," JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 24, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, World
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Netanyahu vigorously denounced the agreement, avowing that the
DOP would, lead inexorably to the creation of a Palestinian
state.2° Yet the day after the Knesset approved the DOP,
Netanyahu implied that the Likud would, if it came to power,
abide by -the DOP
21
On September 23, 1993, ten days after the Washington, D.C.,
signing ceremony, the Knesset approved the DOP by a vote of
sixty-one to fifty.22  Knesset members voting for approval
included those whom opposition leader Netanyahu derisively called
the "PLO votes," that is, members of the Democratic Front for
Peace and Equality and the Democratic Arab Party.23  Eight
members abstained from the historic vote, including three
members of the Likud.24
The PLO's internal approval of the DOP followed a more
tortuous path. Arafat did not submit the DOP to the Palestinian
National Council for its approval. Instead, he first presented the
DOP to the PLO Executive Committee, and then to the Palestine
Central Council. 25  After Arafat submitted the DOP to the
Executive Committee, six of its eighteen members resigned.26 . A
majority of those remaining approved the accord, as did the
members of the Palestine Central Council.27
The Executive Committee members' mass resignation was one
of a series of internal PLO protests against the peace process. A
number of prominent members of Arafat's own Fatah faction
dissented from the DOE Faruq Qaddumi, the head of the PLO's
political section, and the organization's second in seniority after
Library, ALLNWS File.
20. Likud Leader Binyamin Netanyahu's Knesset Speech Opposing Israel-PLO Accord
(Kol Yisrael radio broadcast, Sept. 21, 1993), in PEACE WATCH, supra note 14, at 88-90.
21. Izenberg, supra note 19.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The Likud Knesset members who abstained, in the face of a party decision to
oppose the DOP, were Assad Assad, Ronni Milo, and Meir Sheetrit. Additionally,
Sheetrit claimed that a large number of Likud Knesset members supported the agreement
but were afraid to act on their beliefs. Id.
25. PLO Statement, supra note 16; see also KING, supra note 6, at 128-29.
26. PLO Statement, supra note 16, at 91-92.
27. KING, supra note 6, at 129; PLO Statement, supra note 16, at 91-92. The
Executive Committee's approval was grudging; in addition to approving the DOP, the
Executive Committee "stress[ed] that stopping all activities of settlement, particularly in
Holy Jerusalem, constitutes a main element for ensuring the success of the transitional
arrangements." PLO Statement, supra note 16, at 92.
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Arafat, was among those abstaining from the Executive Committee
vote.28  Other prominent PLO representatives opposing the
accord included Haida Abdelshafi, head of the Palestinian
delegation to the bilateral peace talks in Washington, D.C., and
Hanni al-Hassan, a member of the Fatah Central Committee.29
Of course, the PLO's Fatah faction did not comprise the sole
opponents to the accord. Four rival PLO factions joined with six
other groups, including Hamas, in forming the "National, Demo-
crat and Islamic Front" to contest the accord.3" On October 9,
1993, the opposition alliance issued a statement in Damascus,
Syria, vowing to "continue the struggle and jihad against the
Zionist enemy to achieve all our Palestinian people's objec-
tives."31
Israel's decision to seal an agreement with Yasser Arafat
stemmed not from any recognition of the legitimacy of his
leadership. Indeed, some observers believe that Israel chose to
deal with Arafat because the PLO was in crisis and Arafat's
political base was eroding, apparently in the belief that these
events would make Arafat a more willing partner.32 At the time
the DOP took effect, "the PLO's political organization and
infrastructure in the territories barely exist[ed]," with Hamas and
other Islamic radicals winning most of the PLO's lost authority in
Gaza, Judea, and Samaria.33
In another development bearing on. Israel's continuing
inability to suppress the intifada, Arafat's reputation as a terrorist
appears to have served as a positive factor in Israel's decision to
deal with him. Speaking to the Labour faction at the start of
Knesset's DOP debate, Rabin proclaimed that the PLO probably
28. Judith Wrubel, Palestinian Opposition to the Israel-PLO Accord, in PEACE
WATCH, supra note 14, at 125. Qaddumi's abstention also may have been attributable to
the fact that he was kept unaware of the Oslo discussions. See KING, supra note 6, at 129.
29. Wrubel, supra note 28, at 126.
30. Id at 126-27.
31. Statement by Ten Palestinian Opposition Factions (AI-Quds Palestinian radio
broadcast, Oct. 9, 1993), in PEACE WATCH, supra note 14, at 129.
32. According to Ehud Ya'ari, a respected Middle East analyst and Israel Television's
commentator on Middle East affairs. "[Tlhe Oslo agreement was made possible by the
internal crisis in the PLO, which was at its nadir immediately prior to the agreement.
Recent months had seen mounting challenges to Yasser Arafat: There was open talk of
assassination and his political base was steadily eroding." Ehud Ya'ari, The Crisis in
Palestinian Politics and the Oslo Agreement, in PEACE WATCH, supra note 14, at 75.
33. Id. at 76.
1995]
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could preserve law and order in the territories under its control
without the "constraints imposed by the Supreme Court and other
bodies., 34  Rabin's statement seemed to predict that the PLO
would be more effective in quelling the intifada than was Israel.35
On yet another occasion, Rabin brushed off Arafat's failure to
condemn post-DOP acts of terrorism against Israelis with this
blunt remark: "I do not expect them to show such chivalry at this
time. We know whom we are dealing with.,
36
Among the Israeli public, the DOP initially enjoyed strong
support. As of September 27, 1993, shortly after the signing
ceremony and Knesset approval, sixty percent of Israelis supported
the "Gaza-Jericho First" plan, while thirty-eight percent opposed
it.37 It did not take long for the numbers to change; by Novem-
ber 19, 1993, less than two months later, the percentage of Israelis
approving the autonomy plan had dropped to forty-eight percent,
while the percentage opposing the plan had jumped to forty-seven
percent.38  Voters expressed their declining support for the DOP
in more concrete terms: in November 1993, Likud candidates
prevailed in several local elections, including the one in Jerusa-
lem.39 Rabin had encouraged Israelis to link their local election
votes to confidence in the accord with the PLO.'
34. Rabin, supra note 14, at 84.
35. Id
36. Interview with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on Terror, Peace Process (Kol Yisrael
radio broadcast, Oct. 25, 1993), in PEACE WATCH, supra note 14, at 227. Nevertheless,
in his September 9, 1993 letter to Rabin, Arafat pledged that the PLO "renounces the use
of terrorism." ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 7, at 38.
37. Tracking Poll of Israelis Inside the Green Line, August 29, 1993-December 13, 1993,
in PEACE WATCH, supra note 14, at 73.
38. Id The results of a December 1993 poll showed that Israeli voter preferences
also had changed. Israeli Opinion Poll" Changes In Voter Preferences, December, 1993, in
PEACE WATCH, supra note 14, at 230. Voter preference for the Labour and Meretz
coalition parties had declined, while preference for the Likud and Tsomet, both opposition
parties, had increased. Id.
39. Anton La Guardia, Israeli Peace Talks Go On After Poll Loss, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 4, 1993, at 14 ("Israel's Prime Minister, Mr Yitzhak Rabin, pledged
yesterday to continue peace negotiations with the Arabs despite the setbacks suffered by
his ruling Labour Party in municipal elections, including defeat of Jerusalem's veteran
mayor, Mr. Teddy Kollek."); Linda Gradstein, Kollek Voted Out as Mayor of Jerusalem,
WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1993, at A28 ("After 28 years as mayor, Jerusalem icon Teddy
Kollek was defeated by right-wing Likud candidate Ehud Olmert today in an election that
could have implications for the Israel-Palestinian accord.").
40. Gradstein, supra note 39, at A28.
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Support for the accord among the Palestinian Arab residents
of the territories declined in a similar fashion. While in September
1993, sixty-five percent of the residents of the territories expressed
support for the accord, in January 1994, that number had dropped
to forty-one percent in January 1994.4
Despite declining enthusiasm for the accord within their.
domestic constituencies, both Israel and the PLO continued taking
steps to carry out the DOP. On May 4, 1994, Israel and the PLO
executed in Cairo an Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho
Area (Cairo Agreement), providing for withdrawal of Israeli forces
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, transfer of authority in those
areas to a Palestinian Authority, and deployment of a Palestinian
police force.42 Under the Cairo Agreement, Israeli forces in
Gaza and Jericho have redeployed, a Palestinian police force has
entered the area, and Arafat himself has taken up residence in
Gaza. Later, on August 29, 1994, Israel and the PLO executed an
Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibili-
ties, providing for the transfer of powers to the Palestinian
Authority in the following five spheres: education and culture,
health, social welfare, tourism, and taxation.
43
Recently, Israel and the PLO signed an interim agreement in
Washington, D.C.44 The agreement, signed under DOP auspices
and before the Knesset had approved the new document, provides
for Palestinian elections and the redeployment of Israeli troops
from seven major towns and cities in the territories, Jenin,
Tulkarm, Nablus, Qalquilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron, by
March 10, 1996.4' As with the DOP, members of the Likud. bloc,
including Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu and former defense
41. Opinion Poll: Palestinian Voter Preferences, January 16, 1994, in PEACE WATCH,
supra note 14, at 139.
42. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, lsr.-PLO,.33
I.L.M. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Cairo Agreement]. Execution of the Cairo Agreement did
not proceed smoothly. During the televised signing ceremony, Arafat initially refused to
sign the maps implementing the Cairo Agreement, contending that the PLO had not
agreed to the borders sketched out on them.. Marie Colvin, Arafat Saw a Ghost as the
World Watched, SUNDAY TIMES (London), May 8, 1994, at 18. Arafat finally relented and
agreed to sign the maps, but wrote in Arabic above his signature: "My signature is made
on the condition that these maps are still under discussion." Id.
43. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 29, 1994,
Isr.-PLO, 34 I.L.M. 455 (1995) [hereinafter Early Empowerment Agreement].
44. Serge Schmemann, Lives Are at Stake; So Are Postal Services and Gas Tanks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at A13.
45. Id.
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minister Ariel Sharon, have expressed opposition to the interim
agreement. Some opposition leaders openly declared- the new
agreement invalid.46 On September 28, the Knesset approved the
agreement by the narrowest of margins, sixty-one to fifty-nine."a
These developments further reflect the sharp divisions between the
two major Israeli parties, Likud and Labour, regarding the wisdom
of the current path embarked on with the PLO. Moreover, Israel
and the PLO have not scheduled concluding negotiations concern-
ing the final status of the territories until the turn of the centu-
ry.' Under these circumstances, the question posed by this
Article retains its relevance and vitality: Under international law,
can Israel legally terminate the DOP, the framework for both
interim agreement and permanent status negotiations?
III. THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
Israel and the PLO executed the DOP, while the United
States and the Russian Federation witnessed. The DOP contains
seventeen articles and comprises two additional categories of
documents: (1) four annexes that address elections, withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Gaza and Jericho, cooperation in economic and
development programs, and regional development programs; and
(2) agreed minutes amplifying the DOP and annexes.4 9
The DOP placed two operative obligations on the parties: to
establish a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee (Article X),
and an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee
46. Joel Greenberg, Settlers Angrily Protest Accord in Hebron, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1995, at A13.
47. Serge Schmemann, Arafat, Backed by Israel, Offers an Olive Branch to Militants,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1995, at A2; Batsheva Tsur, President Weizman: Oslo 11 "is not an
agreement," JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS
File.
48. Alison Mitchell, Arafat and -Rabin Sign Pact to Expand Arab Self-Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at Al.
49. Supplementing the DOP is the September 9, 1993, exchange of correspondence
between Israel and'the PLO, according to Joel Singer, Legal Adviser of the Israel Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. See Joel Singer, The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements (Nov. 1, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
While the DOP itself neither references nor incorporates any of the September 9
correspondence, subsequent agreements between Israel and the PLO appear to bear out
Singer's assertion. Thus, in both the Cairo Agreement and the Early Empowerment
Agreement, the parties "reaffirm[] their adherence to the mutual recognition and
commitments expressed in the letters dated September 9, 1993." See Cairo Agreement,
supra note 42, at pmbl.; Early Empowerment Agreement, supra note 43, at pmbl..
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(Article XI and Annex III).5o The DOP also provided that the
parties would negotiate a number of agreements, including some
relating to: (1) the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and
Jericho (Annex II, Article XIV); (2) elections to the Palestinian
Council (Article III, Annex I); and (3) interim period arran-
gements (Article VII)." Since the execution of the DOP, Israel
and the PLO successfully negotiated only the Cairo Agreement,
relating to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, and an
interim agreement.52
Drawing on the Camp David Agreements between Israel and
Egypt, the DOP sets forth two overarching time deadlines. First,
it provides for a five-year "transitional period,"53 after which
permanent status arrangements will follow.54  The five-year
transitional period begins upon Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and
Jericho, which, pursuant to the Cairo Agreement, was May 4,
1994.55 Second, the DOP further provides that negotiations
concerning the territories' permanent status are to commence no
50. Antonio Cassese views two other DOP articles as imposing operative obligations
on the parties upon the accord's entry into force: (a) Article XIII(1) and (2), relating to
the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip "outside
populated areas"; and (b) Article VI, relating to the commencement of the transfer of
"powers and responsibilities" from the military government and Civil Administration to
the "authorized Palestinians." See Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-
Determination, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 564, 565 (1993). The redeployment of Israeli forces,
however, other than from the Gaza Strip and Jericho pursuant to the Cairo Agreement,
is not required pending agreement, pursuant to Article III and Annex I on "the exact
mode and'conditions" of elections to the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.
Id. Article VI provides for preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities after the
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area; that obligation is itself conditioned
on the successful negotiation of an agreement for Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip
and Jericho. DOP, supra note 6, at art. VI.
51. Cassese argues that each of these three provisions of the DOP is a pacta de
contrahendo, a legal obligation to conclude an agreement. Cassese, supra note 50, at 566.
As Cassese concedes, however, Article VII, relating to the agreement on the interim
period, uses the term "negotiate" rather than the term "conclude" to describe the parties'
obligation under that article. Contrary to Cassese, Joel Singer takes the view that the
DOP requires the "negotiation" of further agreements. See Singer, supra note 49, at 2.
52. Israel and the PLO executed the Cairo Agreement on May 4, 1994. See Cairo
Agreement, supra note 42, at art. XXIII.
53. DOP, supra note 6, at art. V; A Framework for Peace, supra note 111, § A(1)(c).
54. Singer, supra note 49, at 14.
55. DOP, supra note 6, at art. V; Cairo Agreement, supra note 42, at art. XXIII.
120 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 18:109
later than the beginning of the third year of the "interim peri-
od.)
5 6
The DOP also sets forth two subsidiary deadlines, which
neither party met. Pursuant to Article XIV and Annex II of the
DOP, the parties were to conclude and sign an agreement on the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and Jericho within two
months from the date of entry of the DOP, that is, by December
13, 1993."7 In fact, Israel and the PLO finally concluded an
agreement on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho on May
4, 1994, nearly five months behind schedule. The DOP also
contemplates an Israeli-PLO agreement on Council elections,
targeting an election date no later than the ninth month following
the DOP's entry into force, that is, July 13, 1994.58 The interim
56. DOP, supra note 6, at art. V. Articles I and V(1) use the term "transitional
period" to refer to the five-year period that commences upon Israeli withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip and Jericho, while Article V(2) refers to the third year of the "interim period"
as the deadline for commencing permanent status negotiations. Id. Article XXIII(3) of
the Cairo Agreement provides that May 4, 1994, is the commencement date of the
"interim period" referred to in the DOP. At first glance, it appears that the terms
"interim period" and "transitional period" are interchangeable and refer to the same five-
year period. Article I of the DOP, however, provides:
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East
peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-
Goverhment Authority, the elected Council ("the Council"), for the Palestinian
people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not
exceeding five years ...
l at 1527. A reasonable interpretation of Article V(2), in light of Article I, is that
permanent status negotiations need not commence until the beginning of the third year
following establishment of the Council, regardless of the date of Israeli withdrawal from
the Gaza Strip and Jericho. This is consistent with the Camp David accords, which formed
the basis for this portion of the DOP. See A Framework for Peace, supra note 10, §
A(1)(c). According to that section:
When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and
Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will
begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning
of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final
status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors.
Id
57. The DOP entered into force on October 13, 1993, one month after its execution
on September 13, 1993. See DOP, supra note 6, art. XVII.
58. Id. at art. 111(2). The DOP does not expressly provide a deadline or goal for
concluding the Interim Agreement. Because the Interim Agreement, however, shall deal
with, among other things, the structure and authority of the Council, the parties apparently
contemplated that they would negotiate the Interim Agreement before the elections or
within nine months of the entry into force of the DOP.
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agreement between Israel and the PLO, finally signed under the
DOP in Washington, D.C., was fourteen months late.59
IV. PLO VIOLATIONS OF THE DOP AND CAIRO AGREEMENT
Since execution of the DOP and the Cairo Agreement, Israel
and the PLO both have voiced repeated accusations that the other
is violating the agreements or otherwise engaging in conduct
inconsistent with their spirit.6° From the Israeli point of view, or,
perhaps more pointedly, from the point of view of Israel's DOP
critics, examples of PLO conduct inconsistent with either the DOP
or the Cairo Agreement include the following:
1. The PLO has refused to amend its charter to eliminate
provisions inconsistent with the recognition of Israel's right to
61exist.
59. Schmemann, supra note 47, at A2.
60. Israeli government spokesmen more than once have levied charges of DOP
violations against the PLO. On December 13,1994, Israel's Chief Military Judge Advocate
issued a report on PLO violations of both the DOP and the Cairo Agreement Chief
Military Judge Advocate Report on PLO Violations, available in INTERNET, at
(http://haven.ios.con/-likudlother.html) [hereinafter the Judge Advocate Report]. The
Judge Advocate Report drew on information from the Office of the Coordinator for
Activities in the Territories, the Command for Supervision, Coordination and Control for
the Gaza Strip Area, and by Military Intelligence. In other instances, political opponents
of the DOP also have charged the PLO with violations; indeed, domestic political DOP
opponents have seemed more willing to denounce perceived PLO violations than the
Israeli government. Judith Wrubel, The Gaza-Jericho Negotiations: Unresolved Issues, in
PEACE WATCH, supra note 14, at 202-03. One can speculate that the government eschews
the political consequences of attacking the conduct of the PLO with which it so recently
concluded the DOP agreement.. Cf. Fred Charles Ik1d, After Detection-What?, 39 FOREIGN
AFF. 208, 211 (1961). According to Ikl:
[I]f evidence of the violation is equivocal or based on secret intelligence, the
government may be reluctant to acknowledge the evasion or feel unsure of its
ability to convince public opinion. For example, an admission that the control
agreement had failed might be exploited at home by the political opposition,
particularly if the agreement had been made originally by the party in power.
Id.
61. See, e.g., PNC Speaker on Conditions for Convening Session (Al Sha'b radio
broadcast, Aug. 24, 1994), as translated in NEAR EAST AND SoUTH ASIA DAILY REPORT,
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, FBIS-NES-94-164, Aug. 24, 1994, at 6,
microformed on JPRS Reports (National Technical Information Service) (reporting
statements by Salim aI-Za'nun, acting speaker of the Palestine National Council (PNC) and
a member of Fatah's Central Committee, that a new session of the PNC to discuss
amendments to the PLO Charter should await, among other things, an extension of
Palestinian authority to east Jerusalem); Qaddumi on Right to Resistance, PLO Charter
(Radio Monte Carlo radio broadcast, Aug. 16, 1994), as translated in NEAR EAST AND
SouTH ASIA REPORT, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, FBIS-NES-94-159,
Aug. 17, 1994, at 6, microformed on JPRS Reports (National Technical Information
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2. The, PLO has ineffectively responded to terrorism
against Israelis and generally has faltered in prosecuting suspected
terrorists. 62  As a result, since the DOP's execution, attacks on
Israelis have increased substantially.63
3. The PLO has refrained from confiscating unauthorized
weapons in areas under its control.64
Service) (reporting a statement by Faruq Qaddumi, head of the PLO's political
department, that the PLO cannot amend.its charter before an Israeli withdrawal and a
comprehensive peace agreement between the Arabs and Israelis); Modification to
Palestinian Charter Ruled Out (Tunisian Republic radio broadcast, Aug. 12, 1994) as
translated in NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REPORT, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION
SERVICE, FBIS-NEW-94-157, Aug. 15, 1994, at 12, microformed on JPRS Reports
(National Technical Information Service) ("A high-ranking Palestinian official ruled out
any modification to the Palestinian charter before the organization of elections and Israel's
withdrawal from the rest of the West Bank.").
62. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT PURSUANT OF TITLE VIII OF PUBLIC LAW 101-246
FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT 2 (1994) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T REPORT].
According to the State Department Report:
The Palestinian police clearly have not been completely effective in halting
violence and terrorism. In most cases, the police have arrested activists
associated with the faction claiming responsibility for any given act of violence,
but have failed to bring any suspects to trial. Most of those detained have been
released with no charges filed. Acting on information from the Israeli security
forces, the Palestinian police detained three members of the PIJ who were
suspects in the murder of two Israeli soldiers near the Erez checkpoint. The
suspects were released without charge. In many of these cases, the Palestinian
Authority has claimed it had insufficient evidence to prosecute those detained.
Id.
63. Between June 30, 1994, and November 30, 1994, 39 Israelis were killed, including
six in areas under the PLO's control. Id. at 3. Peace Watch, a non-partisan group
monitoring Israeli and PLO compliance with the DOP and related agreements, reported
that terror incidents claimed the lives of 123 Israelis during the 18 months following the
DOP's execution, 85% more than during the 18-month period preceding the agreement.
Suicide Bombings Almost Double Terror Toll Since Oslo, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 13, 1995,
at 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File. Peace Watch also reported that
during 1994, the number of unprovoked attacks by settlers against Palestinians "dropped
sharply." Attacks by Settlers on Palestinians Decrease, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 26, 1995,
at 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File. Section XVIII of the Cairo
Agreement provides that the two sides will take the necessary steps to prevent terrorist
activities and will take appropriate legal action against transgressors. Cairo Agreement,
supra note 42, at 635.
64. Judge Advocate Report, supra note 60, § 21. In one instance, Arafat ordered the
Palestinian police to return to their owners weapons confiscated from Hamas members.
STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 62, at 7. Pursuant to the Cairo Agreement, the PLO
agreed that only members of the Palestinian police force lawfully would possess firearms,
and the PLO agreed to enforce this prohibition on civilians subject to its authority. Cairo
Agreement, supra note 42, at art. IX; and annex I, art. 1.
1995] Terminating the Israel-PLO Declaration 123
4. The PLO has armed more police than authorized
under the DOP.65
5. In May 1994, Arafat, by declaration, purported to
cancel all Israeli legislation enacted since June 5, 1967.6
6. Over a period of several months, the PLO murdered
many Palestinians accused of having collaborated with Israel.67
7. The PLO has engaged in hostile propaganda against
Israel.68
65. While the Cairo Agreement authorizes 8,000 armed Palestinian police, Dord Gold
of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv estimates that there are 17,000
Palestinian police officers. John Donnelly, Suicide Bombers Kill 6 Israelis 3 Americans
Among 45 Hurt in 2 Attacks, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 1995, at A7. In one instance,
Arafat created an unauthorized armed force: Preventive Security Apparatus. John West,
We Can Stop Hamas If PLO Lets Us, Commander Says, Reuters World Service, Aug. 24,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. The Cairo Agreement expressly
prohibits the formation of armed forces, other than the Palestinian police, in areas under
the PLO's control. Cairo Agreement, supra note 42, at art. IX.
66. Judge Advocate Report, supra note 60, at § 27; Sources: Arafat Constitution Plan
Accord Violation (Ha'aretz radio broadcast, May 27, 1994), as translated in NEAR EAST
AND SOUTH ASIA DAILY REPORT, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, FBIS-
NES-105, June 1, 1994, at 47 [hereinafter Constitution Plan], microformed on JPRS
Reports (National Technical Information Service). Israel official Joel Singer called
Arafat's action a violation of the DOP. Id. ("Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser [Joel]
Singer, who played a crucial role in drafting the agreement with the PLO, reacted sharply
to Arafat's reference to jihad and his announcement to annul the military government's
decrees in the territories ... [calling] Arafat's action a violation of the agreement.")
Pursuant to Article VII of the Cairo Agreement, legislation that was valid at the time of
the agreement's execution is to remain valid unless amended or changed by Israel and the
PLO in accordance with specified procedures. Cairo Agreement, supra note 42, art. VII.
67. Rabin Suspends Talks on Release of Palestinians, (Kol Yisrael radio broadcast,
Aug. 15, 1994) as translated in NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REPORT, FOREIGN
BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, FBIS-NES-94-159, Aug. 17, 1994, at 6, microformed
on JPRS Report, (National Technical Information Service).
68. For example, in a November 15, 1994, address in Gaza, Arafat referred to Israel
as the "Zionist enemy." STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 62, at 2. In an earlier speech
in a mosque in Johannesburg, South Africa, Arafat had called for a "jihad" over
Jerusalem. Main Battle Is Jerusalem, JERUSALEM POST, May 18, 1994, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLNWS File. According to reports, Faruq Qaddumi, head of the PLO's
political department, called publicly for Israel's elimination. STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra
note 62, at 2-3; Rabin To Pressure Arafat on Covenant, Terrorism (Ha'aretz radio
broadcast, Aug. 16, 1995), as translated in NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REPORT,
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, FBIS-NES-94-158, Aug. 16, 1994, at 33,
microformed on JPRS REPORT (National Technical Information Service). In the Cairo
Agreement, the PLO had agreed to "abstain from incitement, including hostile
propaganda, ... [and to] take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any
organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction." Cairo Agreement, supra
note 42, at art. XII.
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8. When Arafat arrived in Gaza in July 1994, his motor-
cade included four terrorists wanted for the Ma'alot massacre.69
9. The Palestinian Authority is operating at least seven
institutions in East Jerusalem: the Religious Affairs Ministry, the
Energy Centre, the Bureau of Statistics, the Office of the Mufti of
Jerusalem, the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and
Reconstruction, the Palestinian Broadcasting Cooperation, and
Orient House.7"
10. The Palestinian Authority refused formal Israeli
requests to extradite suspects in the murders of three Israelis.71
The PLO, for its part, claims that Israel, too, has violated
terms of the parties' agreements. Israeli violations, the PLO
alleges, include: cordoning off the Gaza Strip and the West Bank,
collective punishment of Palestinians by Israel, Israeli confiscation
of land, West Bank settlement activities, and an Israeli threat to
cease negotiations with the PLO.72
V. THE LEGAL EFFECr OF THE DOP
Since Israel and the PLO executed the DOP, legal commenta-
tors have disagreed over the agreement's status as a matter of
international law. One commentator argues for treating the DOP
69. David Makovsky, Arafat 'Sneaks in' Terrorists, Israel Expels Them, but Allows
Them Back in After PLO Threat, JERUSALEM POST, July 23, 1994, at 1, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
70. Seven Palestinian Self-Rule Institutions in Jerusalem, Agence France Presse, Mar.
7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (citing the Israeli watchdog group,
Peace Watch).
71. According to the Judge Advocate Report, the formal Israeli requests were for the
suspected murderers of Uri Megidish, Gil Rave, and Shlomo Kapach. Judge Advocate
Report, supra note 60, § 4; see also Evelyn Gordon, PA Refuses to Hand Over Killers of
Uri Megidish, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 2, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLNWS File. Israel made its requests pursuant to Article 11 (7) of Annex III to the
Cairo Agreement, providing the right to demand .extradition from the Palestinian
Authority of anyone suspected of committing, within Israeli jurisdiction, a crime with at
least a seven-year penalty. Cairo Agreement, supra note 42.
72. Palestinian Meetings in Tunis, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 21, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File; U.S. Secretary of State's Visit, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLNWS File; Arafat Set to Continue Mideast Discussions with Peres in Paris, Agence
France Presse, Feb. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File. Israel
defends certain of these actions, including the closing off of the autonomous areas, as legal
Israeli responses to "relatively minor violations" of the DOP. For a discussion of Israel's
response to Palestinian DOP violations, see supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
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as a treaty between two full-fledged subjects of international
law. 73  Another urges that the DOP is a "soft law" instrument,
and not a treaty, because Palestine is not a state.74 According to
a third, Antonio Cassese, the DOP is "a mixture of various types
of legal undertakings": obligations that become operative when the
DOP enters into force, obligations to conclude additional agree-
ments, and obligations to negotiate future agreements.75 In the
opinion of Joel Singer, Legal Adviser of the Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and a drafter of the DOP, the pact is a "statement
of agreed principles" between Israel and the PLO, an "agreement
to reach agreement."76
The position with the most support is that against viewing the
DOP as a legally binding international agreement. Full analysis of
the issues points to an inexorable conclusion: at most, the DOP is
a binding agreement to continue bilateral negotiations.77 Three
73. Eyal Benvenisti, The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles: A Framework for
Future Settlement, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 542, _545 (1993). In Benvenisti's view, the PLO
acquired status as a subject of international law even prior to Israeli recognition and the
DOP's signing. Id. at 544-45. While Benvenisti acknowledges that the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Laws of Treaties; applicable to international agreements between states,
does not apply to the DOP, he argues that the DOP is still a valid international agreement
subject "to the customary laws of treaties, some of which are reflected in the [Vienna]
Convention." Id at 545. Benvenisti, however, undercuts his own argument that the DOP
is binding when he characterizes the agreement as a "framework for negotiations... [and]
establishes basic principles only." Id. at 546.
74. Katherine W. Meighan, Note, The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles: Prelude
to a Peace?, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 435, 448-51 (1994) [hereinafter Prelude to Peace].
75. Cassese, supra note 50, at 565. According to Cassese, an obligation to conclude
a further agreement (pacta de contrahendo) makes it "incumbent upon the parties to agree
upon a specific legal regulation of the matter outlined in generic terms in the pactum."
Id. at 566. An obligation to negotiate future agreements (pacta de negotiando), in
Ca(sese's view, also imposes a binding legal obligation: the parties are "dutybound to enter
into negotiations," and they may not "(1) advance excuses for not engaging into or
pursuing negotiations or (2) to accomplish acts which would defeat the object and the
purpose of the future treaty." Id. at 567.
76. Singer, supra note 49, at 276.; CORBIN, supra note 8, at 6. Raja Shihadeh, a
former legal adviser to the Palestinian delegation at the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations,
has described the DOP as "only the preamble to the first phase [of resolving the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict] which shall begin with the limited withdrawal of Israeli forces from
the Gaza Strip and Jericho." Raja Shihadeh, Can the Declaration of Principles Bring
About a "Just and Lasting Peace"?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 555, 561 (1993).
77. As discussed below, even a nonbinding agreement may generate domestic or
international political pressure on the parties to adhere to the agreement's terms. See
Prelude to Peace, supra note 74, at 449 ("[S]oft law instruments may hold substantial
consequences for domestic and international political processes, and the likelihood of
repercussions may exert a compelling influence toward compliance.").
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factors particularly bear closer scrutiny: the PLO's status; the DOP
terms and the circumstances surrounding the DOP's execution; and
a comparison of the DOP with other peace agreements between
Israel and its Arab neighbors.
A. The PLO's Legal Status
Generally, treaties enforceable under international law are
those concluded between states. Thus, the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties applies only to "treaties between
States."78 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice sets forth what the international community generally
regards as the four traditional sources of international law.79
These include "international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states."80
Whether the PLO is a state under international law is a
question that has provoked considerable and vociferous debate.81
Before the DOP, and despite its November 1988 declaration of
statehood, the PLO met none of the traditional criteria of
statehood: a defined territory, a permanent population, a
government, and a capacity to conduct international relations.'
78. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, art. 1, 1155
U.N.T.S. 33. See also id. art. 2(1)(a) ("For the purposes of the present Convention 'treaty'
means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation.").
79. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, June 26, 1945, art. 38,
59 Stat. 1055, 1060; Prelude to Peace, supra note 74, at 450.
80. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 79, art. 38(1)(a)
at 1060.
81. For pre-DOP analysis, see, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Admission of "Palestine"
as a Member of a Specialized Agency and Withholding the Payment of Assessments in
Response, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 218, 219 (1990); James L. Prince, Note, The International
Legal Implications of the November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 25 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 681 (1989); Anis F. Kassim, The Palestinian Liberation Organization's Claim
to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law, 9 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1,
18-25 (1980). For a discussion of the PLO's status under international law following the
execution of the DOP, see Prelude to Peace, supra note 74, at 451.
82. .See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (setting forth the criteria of statehood);
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 156 L.N.T.S. 25 (1936)
("The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; (d) capacity to enter
into relations with other states."). See also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d
44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) ("It is quite clear that the PLO meets none of these [Restatement
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Undoubtedly, the DOP and its auxiliary agreements have added
impetus to PLO assertions of statehood. Following the Cairo
Agreement's entry into force, the PLO could claim a defined
territory (the Gaza Strip and Jericho), 3 a permanent population
(the residents of those areas), and a government (the Palestinian
Authority). The DOP and subsequent agreements, however, limit
control exercised by the autonomous PLO, and nullify any PLO
authority to conduct international relations. Thus, the PLO
possesses neither unilateral legislative authority,8 nor personal
jurisdiction over Israelis. 85 The PLO further lacks functional
jurisdiction over internal security, military installations, 86 external
security,87 and foreign relations.88  Moreover, the text of the
DOP parallels Israel's stated opposition to the creation of an
independent Palestinian state in the territories.89  Without
meeting the statehood criteria, recognition by other countries of
the state of Palestine is insufficient to confer such status on the
PLO under international law.'
Some scholars contend that, even if the PLO is not a state,
precedent exists for according legitimacy to international
Section 201] requirements"); Kirgis, supra note 81, at 219. The 1974 decision by the
General Assembly of the U.N. to grant the PLO observer status may have granted the
PLO some limited rights under international law, but it did not confer statehood on the
PLO. G.A. Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3237
(1974); HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 120 (1988).
83. One can define territory sufficiently so as to satisfy the criteria for statehood even
where the parties have not finally settled the boundaries because of a territorial dispute.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 201 cmt. b (1987).
84. Cairo Agreement, supra note 42, art. VII.
85. Cairo Agreement, supra note 42, art. V(1)(c).
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id.; see also Cairo Agreement, supra note 42, art. VI(2)(a). Article VI(2)(a)
provides:
In accordance with the Declaration of Principles, the Palestinian Authority will
not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, which
sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types
of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the Gaza Strip
or the Jericho Area, the appointment or admission of diplomatic and consular
staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.
Id
89. Indeed, the Preamble to the DOP states that it is entered into by "the
Government of the State of Israel" and the "PLO Team." DOP, supra note 6, at pmbl.
90. See Prince, supra note 81,698-705. Indeed, improper recognition of statehood may
violate international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 202 cmt. f.
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agreements between states and national liberation organizations.91
Although treaties and customary international law grant recogni-
tion to agreements between states,92 and between states and
national organizations, 93 agreements between states and national
liberation organizations are a different story. No multilateral
treaty like the Vienna Convention bestows status on such
agreements. Additionally, the few pacts between states and
national liberation organizations delineate no general practice
sufficiently accepted to constitute international customary law.9'
Indeed, with respect to the PLO, there appears to have been no
general acceptance of its competence to conduct international'
relations.95
91. See Benvenisti, supra note 73, at 544-45. Benvenisti cites three examples of
.national liberation organizations entering into international agreements: the Algerian*
F.L.N., the African Independence Party of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, and the
Polisario in the western Sahara. Id. at 544. Benvenisti's reliance on the Algerian example
is problematic because France and the F.L.N. did not conclude the agreement following
French constitutional procedure and the parties never registered it under Article 102 of
the U.N. Charter. SHABTA1 ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-
1986, at 90 (1989). In any event, Benvenisti's view does not represent a consensus of
opinion among international legal scholars on this subject. See, e.g., B. SEN, DIPLOMAT'S
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 549 (1988) (stating that agreements
with the PLO, even if binding, are not treaties).
92. See Vienna Convention, supra note 78, at 333.
93. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21,1986,25 I.L.M. 543 (1986).
94. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(b), supra note 79,
at 1060; see also MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 27-28 (1983). According to Akehurst:
Major inconsistencies in the practice (that is, a large amount of practice
which goes against the rule in question) prevent the creation of a customary rule.
Minor inconsistencies (that is, a small amount of practice which goes against the
rule in question) do not prevent the creation of a customary rule ... although in
such cases the rule in question probably needs to be supported by a large amount
of practice, in order to outweigh the conflicting practice.
Id. at 28. Isolated instances of governments entering into international agreements with
national liberation organizations are not sufficient to establish customary law, particularly
given the fact that those agreements appear inconsistent with general practice. See
WILSON, supra note 82, at 122 (noting that national liberation organizations recognized by
the U.N. may express the views of the people in their respective territories, but may not
conduct international relations).
95. For example, for most of the PLO's existence, the U.S. has refused to engage it
in a formal dialogue, based on its status as a terrorist organization. See, e.g., International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 1302, 99 Stat.
190 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). The Act provides:
[N]o officer or employee of the United States Government and no agent or other
individual acting on behalf of the United States Government shall negotiate with
the PLO or any representatives thereof (except in emergency or humanitarian
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B. The DOP's Text & Circumstances Surrounding Its Execution
Even where subjects of international law competent to execute
treaties reach a written understanding, that pact rises to the level
of a treaty only if it aims to create legal rights and obligations
between the parties.' Important criteria in this regard include:
"(1) intention of the parties to be bound under international law,
(2) significance of the agreement, (3) specificity of the agreement,
and (4) form of the agreement." 97 An agreement lacking any
intent of creating legal rights and obligations between the parties
similarly lacks legal effect (it is sans portge juridique).9'
An agreement's text is unlikely to state expressly that its
signatory authorities invest it with no binding intent.99 Thus, to
ascertain the parties' underlying aims, one must examine the
instrument's language, and the circumstances of its conclusion and
adoption." °  The following are indicia of agreement language
lacking a binding intent: (1) lack of precision, or generality of
terms, (2) statements of general intention or aims, and (3) broad
declarations of principles."1  Relevant circumstances of an
agreement include: (1) whether the agreement is registered
situations) unless and until the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist, accepts
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounces the use
of terrorism.
Id. The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 requires the President as a condition
to suspension of U.S. laws prohibiting the U.S. government from negotiating with the PLO,
to report to Congress every six months concerning the PLO's compliance with its
commitments in the two September 9, 1993 letters signed by Arafat. Middle East Peace
Facilitation Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 583, 108 Stat. 488 (1994).
96. B. SEN, supra note 91, at 548; see also Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of
Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977) ("[A] treaty or
international agreement is said to require an intention by the parties to create legal rights
and obligations or to establish relations governed by international law.").
97. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 25-26
(Comm. Print 1993) (prepared by Cong. Research Service).
98. Schachter, supra note 96, at 296-97.
99. Id. at 297. A notable exception is the Helsinki Final Act, which states that parties
are not to register it with the U.N. as a treaty pursuant to Article 102 of the U.N. Charter.
See Conference on Cooperation and Security ,and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act,
Helsinki, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1293 (1975).
100. Schachter, supra note 96, at 297.
101. On the other hand, a document's title generally is useless in determining its
binding effect. It. at 298. Thus, the DOP's title does not necessarily suggest that Israel
and the PLO intended the agreement as a nonbinding statement of'principles.
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pursuant to Article 102 of the U.N. Charter;1  and (2) whether
submissions to national parliaments or courts characterize it as a
treaty.13
The DOP's language, in many respects, is inconsistent with
binding intent. Israel and the PLO limited the pact's primary
obligations to the creation of two committees, a Joint Israeli-
Palestinian Liaison Committee and an Israeli-Palestinian Economic
Cooperation Committee."° These panels provide forums for
further debate between parties after the DOP takes effect." 5
Israel and the PLO left for future agreements issues at the heart
of the DOP: autonomy, withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho,
elections to the Palestinian Council, and the territories' permanent
status. Joel Singer, Legal Advisor of the Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, accurately characterized the DOP as a "statement of
agreed principles" between Israel and the PLO; in other words, it
is an "agreement to reach agreement.''!6
As a preliminary agreement that lays down principles for
future negotiations, the DOP resembles the Camp David accords.
While the latter set up a framework for future Israel-Egypt talks
and ultimately led to a peace treaty, it stopped short of obligating
Israel to withdraw from any territory before the subsequent
102. Article 102 of the U.N. Charter provides as follows:
(1) Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member
of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as
possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
(2) No party to any treaty or international agreement which has not been
registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article ma'
invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER article 102. The purpose of treaty registration, as required by Article 102,
is "to give effect to the principle and policy of 'open covenants'-enunciated by as the first
of President Wilson's Fourteen Points-in lieu of secret diplomacy." Mala Tabory, Recent
Developments in United Nations Treaty Registration and Publication Practices, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 350 (1982).
103. Schachter, supra note 96, at 298.
104. DOP, supra note 6, arts. X, and XI.
105. See supra notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text.
106. Singer, supra note 49. While Antonio Cassese has argued that the provisions in
the DOP relating to the negotiation of future agreements create binding legal obligations,
he acknowledges that the provision requiring the negotiation of a final status arrangement
leaves much "to the goodwill of the two Parties," and an agreement "is to a large extent
contingent upon the future political attitude of the Parties and their continuing desire to
come to terms and strike substantive deals on this intricate web of problems." Cassese,
supra note 50, at 568.
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treaty's conclusion.'0 7 At most, such international "agreements
to agree" obligate parties to conduct future negotiations in good
faith."° Such agreements commit the parties "to the principle of
cooperation in the area in question," and "can provide an
institutional framework for and facilitate such future cooperation,
while permitting the parties to work out the specific terms and
details of their cooperation over time or in the light of developing
conditions."'' One critical difference exists between the DOP
and Camp David agreements. Unlike Egypt, the PLO is not a
state.'
The Camp David accords, like the DOP, failed to create
effective dispute resolution provisions or establish sanctions for
noncompliance. Pursuant to Article XV of the DOP, dispute
resolution is to be by negotiation, or, if the parties agree, by
conciliation or arbitration."1  Plainly, this mechanism breaks
down if one or both of the parties ceases its commitment to
negotiating the future agreements that the DOP envisions." 2
Circumstances surrounding execution of the DOP are also
instructive. Unlike Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and
Jordan, and Israel's unratified agreement with Lebanon, the DOP
contains no provision requiring registration of the agreement with
the U.N. Secretariat pursuant to Article 102 of the U.N. Char-
ter. 3 Significantly, the Camp David accords also contained no
107. A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel,
Sept. 17, 1979, Isr.-Egypt, 1136 U.N.T.S. 200.
108. See RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT 34 (1981) (agreements to agree "involve only a commitment to future
negotiation"). Moshe Dayan, then Israel's foreign minister, and William Quandt, a
member of Jimmy Carter's National Security Council staff during the Camp David
negotiations, both appear to have viewed the Camp David accords as an agreement to
agree, that is, as an agreement binding Egypt and Israel to conduct future negotiations.
See WILLIAM B. QUANDT, CAMP DAVID: PEACEMAKING AND POLITIcS 254 (1986) ("The
Camp David accords were essentially one more step, but an extremely important one, in
the continuing process of negotiations."); see also DAYAN, supra note 17, at 194. Dayan
characterizes the Camp David accords as "the basis for negotiating a peace treaty with
Egypt."
109. BILDER, supra note 108, at 35.
110. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
111. DOP, supra note 6, art. XV.
112. Prelude to Peace, supra note 74, at 459.
113. Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, Mar.
26, 1979, Egypt-Tsr., art. IX(4), 1136 U.N.T.S. 116, (1979) [hereinafter Egypt-sr. Peace
Treaty]; Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government
of the Republic of Lebanon, May 17, 1983, Isr.-Leb., art. 12, 22 I.L.M. 715 (1983); Treaty
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registration provision, although Egypt and Israel did register that
agreement after conclusion of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty."'
During Knesset debate on the DOP, Israeli officials implied
that the DOP was not binding or, at a minimum, created no
substantive commitments on Israel's part. Prime Minister Rabin,
for example, described the DOP as a starting point in negotiations
with the PLO, asserting that "some 80% remains for the
negotiations on the implementation."'1 5 Aryeh Deri of the Shas
faction, a member of the ruling coalition who abstained during the
DOP vote, asserted that the agreement was not a treaty."'
On the other hand, the fact that the Knesset debated the DOP
may reflect an Israeli belief that the agreement represents a
political landmark, regardless of whether the DOP is binding.
Israeli domestic law does not require parliamentary approval to
ratify an international agreement; the Government (Cabinet) may
enter on international agreement on its own authority."7 Never-
of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Oct. 26,1994,
Isr.-Jordan, art. 30, 34 I.L.M. 53 (1995).
114. Egypt registered the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel treaty on May 15,
1979. See Egypt-Isr. Peace Treaty, art. IX(4), supra note 113; see also A Framework for
Peace, supra note 10, at 196. Israel registered the Camp David accords shortly thereafter,
on June 14, 1979. See Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty, Isr.-Egypt, Sept.
17, 1978, 1138 U.N.T.S. 53 (1979).
.115. Rabin, supra note 14, at 84.
116. Izenberg, supra note 19, at 1 ("[W]e are not talking about a peace treaty here; we
are talking about a declaration of principles regarding which most of the details have not
yet been resolved... The (outcome) depends upon the steadfastness of the negotiators.")
(alterations in original).
117. At a first glance, Israeli law would appear to require Knesset approval of treaties.
See BASIC LAW: PRESIDENT OF THE STATE § 11(a)(5). That provision of Israeli
constitutional law states: "The President of the State shall sign such conventions with
foreign states as have been ratified by the Knesset." Id. Despite this apparently clear
language, successive Israeli governments have taken the position that only where a treaty
is, in fact, submitted to the Knesset for approval, shall the President sign it. KATE
HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 376-77 (1967). Holloway cites from a
1951 memorandum the Government of Israel sent to the U.N., setting forth the division
of authority between and among the Knesset, the Government, and the President in the
treaty-making power area:
(a) The legal power to negotiate, sign and ratify international treaties on behalf
of Israel is vested exclusively in the Government of Israel and is in the charge of
the Minister for Foreign Affairs;
(b) Where the Knesset has given its approval to the ratification of the treaty, the
act of ratification is signed by the President of the State;
(c) Where the President of the State performs acts connected with the treaty-
making power, the documents have to bear the attesting signature of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs acting on behalf and under the authority of the Government;
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theless, Israel has submitted a number of significant agreements to
the Knesset for approval, among them the Genocide Convention,
the Camp David accords, and the peace treaty with Egypt."'8
Given that Israel submitted the Camp David accords, also an
agreement to agree, to the Knesset, Knesset approval represents
ambiguous evidence of an intent to bind Israel to an agreement's
substantive legal obligations.
VI. WHAT RECOURSE Is AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL FOR PLO
BREACHES OF THE DOP?
Any recourse available to Israel for PLO violations of the
DOP depends on the DOP's legal status. 9 If it is a nonbinding
agreement, it "does not engage" Israel's legal responsibility; the
state is free to terminate without legal consequences. 120  If it is
an agreement to agree that binds Israel to continuing negotia-
tions-a pacta de negotiando in Cassese's schematic-an Israeli
wish for redress excuses neither acts intended to defeat the
agreement nor a prolonged suspension in negotiations.121 Con-
versely, a binding international agreement requires that Israeli
(d) General parliamentary control over the actions of the Government in the
sphere of treaty-making power is exercised by means of the procedure of
proposing motions of non-confidence;
(e) If the international treaty necessitates changes in the domestic law, the
Government will not normally ratify the treaty until it is appraised of the attitude
of the Knesset.
Id. at 377-79. See also Yehuda Z. Blum, The Ratification of Treaties in Israel, 2 ISR. L.
REV. 121 (1967). On the other hand, even if not legally required, Israel has made Knesset
approval a precondition to an agreement's international effectiveness. See DAYAN, supra
note 17, at 194 (stating that Israel "made it clear at Camp David that the agreement was
subject to Knesset approval").
118. Opinions, 19 ISR. L. REV. 294 (1984).
119. Israel in 1992'amended its BASIC LAW: THE GOVERNMENT to provide for direct
elections for the Prime Minister. BASIC LAW: THE GOVERNMENT §§ 4-6. Even that
change, however, is unlikely to result in the sort of political stalemate where the elected
Prime Minister holds one view of the DOP, and a majority of the Knesset holds another.
BASIC LAW: THE GOVERNMENT still contemplates that the Government, consisting of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, will continue to chart a cautious course when faced with
divisive foreign policy decisions. Even though directly elected, the Prime Minister still
must summon enough broad support to form a government; otherwise, new elections must
take place. See id. §§ 14-15.
120. Schachter, supra note 96, at 300.
121. Cassese, supra note 50, at 567.
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responses to PLO violations must comport with customary
international law and especially with the Vienna Convention. 22
A. The DOP as a Nonbinding Agreement
A nonbinding agreement in general "does not engage [the]
legal responsibility" of the parties; noncompliance provides
grounds for neither reparation nor judicial remedies.123 A
nonbinding agreement, however, can sustain legal consequences;
contracting parties may regard the pact as controlling.124 The
DOP, at least at first, kindled both domestic and international
expectations that its parties would achieve the goals set forth. 25
The potential for international and domestic political consequences
in the event the agreement fails "may exert a compelling influence
toward compliance.,
126
Continuing PLO violations of the DOP, of its September 9,
1993 pledges, and of the Cairo Agreement, especially PLO failure
to stem anti-Israel terrorism, could dampen any domestic political
consequences from Israeli noncompliance. In the months before
the November 1995 assassination of Rabin, domestic enthusiasm
for the DOP had plunged so low that observers viewed fresh DOP
overtures toward peace with the Palestinians as jeopardizing the
Rabin government's chances in the forthcoming election. 27
Regardless of the circumstances, some international criticism would
likely greet any Israeli noncompliance. The backlash might lack
force; however, the United States, for example, on at least one
occasion, voiced understanding of Israel's hesitation to redeploy
more troops.'28 Still, an Israeli repudiation of the DOP triggered
122. International Law and the United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 INT'L
LAW. 331, 361 (1984) [hereinafter Grenada Report].
123. Schachter, supra note 96, at 300.
124. Id.
125. After the attack by Kiryat Arba resident Baruch Goldstein at the Tomb of the
Patriarchs in Hebron, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution supporting the DOP
and calling on the parties to implement it. S. C. Res. 904, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,_3351st
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/904, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 548 (1994).
126. Prelude to Peace, supra note 74, at 449.
127. Gellman, supra note 4 ("Some cabinet ministers say openly that public outrage at
a two-month surge in terrorist attacks, which is expressing itself as disapproval of the peace
pact with the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, could cost Labour the 1996 election.").
128. Daniel Williams, Arafat Pledges to Crack Down on Hamas Terror, WASH. POST,
Dec. 8, 1994, at A36. According to Williams,
Israeli officials ... have raised the possibility of a retreat from the accord on
West Bank troop pullouts on grounds that Arafat has failed to crack down on the
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by electoral changes in the ruling coalition most likely would
provoke an especially hostile international reaction. 29
B. The DOP as an Agreement to Agree
If one views the DOP as a binding agreement to agree, it
obliges Israel to negotiate in good faith with the PLO. Thus, the
international community could construe any Israeli moves to
defeat a future treaty or to confound talks as breaching a promise
to negotiate. 13' To avoid breaching a promise to negotiate in
good faith, parties to such an agreement ought to refrain from "an
unjustified breaking off of the discussions, abnormal delays,
disregard[ing] of agreed procedures, [and] systematic refusals to
take into consideration adverse proposals or interests.
'" 131
According to this standard, Israeli actions to terminate post-
DOP negotiations, or otherwise to engage in reprisals toward the
PLO, must comply with good faith and avoid the appearance of
pretext. To the extent that Israel takes good "faith" action against
PLO violations of the DOP and the Cairo Agreement, it could
justify its conduct as within the scope of its obligations under an
agreement to agree. On the other hand, an Israeli decision to ter-
minate negotiations based solely on a political change of heart
would contravene Israel's obligations under a DOP viewed as a
binding agreement to agree.
C. The DOP as a Binding Treaty
Considering the DOP a binding international agreement
would constrain Israel to international treaty law. The Vienna
Convention explains the conditions under which a treaty party may
invalidate or withdraw its consent. Under that multilateral
agreement, a state may legally invalidate or terminate a treaty (1)
Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas, which has taken responsibility for
several terrorist attacks on Israelis in recent weeks. In a statement issued
Tuesday [Dec. 6, 1994], [U.S. Secretary of State Warren] Christopher expressed
sympathy with the Israelis' hesitation.
id.
129. Believing that the DOP was bad policy, the Likud initially opposed it, even before
its approval by Knesset. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. At least at first,
one could not characterize the Likud's opposition as reaction to PLO violations of the
DOP.
130. Cassese, supra note 50, at 567.
131. In the Matter of the Utilization of the Waters of Lake Lanoux (Fr.-Sp. Arb. Trib.),
12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957), quoted in BILDER, supra note 108, at 35.
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in response to a material breach by the other party to the
agreement, or (2) based on a fundamental change of
circumstances. 132
1. Material Breach
The Vienna Convention defines a material breach as a
"repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the ... Convention,"
or "the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of
the object or purpose of the treaty."'133 Under that meaning, the
PLO to date has breached a number of its obligations under the
DOE These include: failure to amend the PLO's Charter; failure
to act to prevent violence against Israelis; arming of nonauthorized
forces; failure to enforce prohibitions against unauthorized
possession of weapons; failure to refrain from hostile propaganda
against Israel; and unilateral enactment of legislation within the
autonomous regions. 3 For Israel to invoke PLO violations in
canceling the DOP, the critical inquiry is whether PLO breaches
are sufficiently "material" to justify termination.
PLO violations of the DOP are material within.the meaning
of the Vienna Convention: that is, they are violations of "provi-
sion[s] essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose"
of the agreement. 35 At its most basic level, the parties intended
132. Vienna Convention, supra note 78, arts. 46-52. The mere fact of a change in
governments, such as the substitution of a Likud-led government for the one now headed
by Labour, provides no legal basis to terminate a treaty. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES 668 (1961). According to Lord McNair:
Governments are the agents or representatives of States; they constantly figure
as the parties to international agreements of the less formal type, but those
agreements bind their States. The statement that, in the eye of the law, the
parties to treaties are States so that treaties remain in force in spite of changes
in the form of Governments, is supported by ample textbook authority and is
indeed obvious.
Id Similarly, no legal basis seems to exist for terminating a treaty solely based on its loss
of public support, regardless of whether a prior or incumbent government executed the
treaty.
133. Vienna Convention, sujra note 78, art. 60(3). The drafters of the Vienna
Convention rejected a proposal to limit the right of unilateral termination to cases of
"fundamental breach." Grenada Report, supra note 122, at 361. The drafters employed
the term "material breach" to clarify that a breach of a provision considered by a party
to be essential to the effective execution of the treaty may be "material," even if the
provision is "of an entirely ancillary character." Id; Second Report on the Law of Treaties
(Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur) [1963] 1 Y.B. Int'l L.Comm'n 36, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/156/1963.
134. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
135. Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 60(3).
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the DOP to promote peaceful relations between Palestinians and
Israelis. 3 6 PLO violations of DOP provisions relating to Israelis'
security impede Israel's attempts to fulfill the agreement's most
basic purpose: ending civil bloodshed.137  Because the PLO has
materially violated the DOP, the Vienna Convention sanctions
Israeli withdrawal of consent under the DOE1
38
Even for treaties governed by the Vienna Convention,
international law sustains rights of reprisal for violations, even for
those lesser offenses deemed insufficiently material to justify
termination. 139  In exercising those rights, the aggrieved party
may suspend its obligations under the agreement or take propor-
tionate measures against the offending party.""4 The late Prime
Minister Rabin's legal advisers favored this approach. They are
reported as believing that sanctions like closing off the autono-
mous areas and canceling safe passage from Gaza to Jericho
136. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 14, at 85. ("[T]his government decided to put an end
to the terror and war, to try to build a new world in the state, at home, in the family which
did not know even one year or one month of its life in which mothers did not cry for their
sons"). See also DOP, supra note 6, at pmbl. According to the Preamble of the DOP:
The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team ... agree that it is
time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their
mutual and legitimate political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence
and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive
peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.
Id.
137. PLO violations of the DOP directly or indirectly relating to Israeli security,
include: the failure to take effective steps to prevent attacks against Israelis or to punish
the perpetrators of such attacks and the creation of unauthorized armed forces.
Certainly, not every PLO violation of the DOP is "material," thereby justifying
termination under principles of the Vienna Convention. With respect to the Israel-Egypt
peace treaty, Israel appears to have taken the view, as a practical matter, that Egyptian
violation of the normalization provisions of that treaty are nonmaterial, given Egypt's
adherence to the security provisions of that agreement. See, e.g., Moshe Sasson, Has the
Peace Proved Itself'?, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 25, 1994, at 7, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLNWS File. Were the PLO complying with the security obligations in the
DOP, observers might consider certain of its actions, such as its unilateral repudiation of
Israeli legislation in the territories, as violations falling short of materiality.
138. Pursuant to Article 70 of the Vienna Convention, when a treaty is terminated, the
parties are relieved from any further obligation to perform. Vienna Convention, supra
note 78, art. 70.
139. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 190
(1991); T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 114 (1974) ("It is generally agreed
that the breach of a treaty obligation by one party entitles the other party to retaliate by
means of peaceable reprisals.").
140. SCHACHTER, supra note 139, at 190-91.
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constitute appropriate Israeli responses to "relatively minor
violations" of the DOP.'
2. Fundamental Change of Circumstances
The Vienna Convention also permits termination based on a
fundamental change of circumstances, formerly known as the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.142  The Convention defines a
fundamental change of circumstances as follows:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has
occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the
conclusion of a treaty; and which was not foreseen by the
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent
of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
143
Under this definition, a "fundamental change of circumstan-
ces" probably means something more than mere noncompliance
with an agreement. Therefore, PLO breaches of the DOP alone
could not themselves support a legal termination."' Moreover,
a termination based on a fundamental change of circumstances
could not, by definition, turn on conditions known to Israeli
government leaders at the time the parties signed the agreement.
While PLO violations of the DOP are irrelevant to the
doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances, that doctrine still
may provide a basis for an Israeli termination of the agreement.
The PLO, in negotiating the DOP, acted as the "representative"
of the Palestinian people.14 An apparent erosion of popular
support for the PLO, however, combined with the organization's
inability to control Hamas or other rejectionist groups, raises
141. Yitzhak Rabin, Sources on PLO Violation of Agreement, (IDF radio broadcast,
May 25, 1994), as translated in NEAR EAST AND SouTH ASIA DAILY REPORT, FOREIGN
BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, FBIS-NES-94-102, May 26,1994, at 34, microformed
on JPRS Reports (National Technical Information Service); see also Constitution Plan,
supra note 66, at 47 (statement by Joel Singer that "Israel has the right to respond with
a violation for each violation").
142. Grenada Report, supra note 122, at 362-63.
143. Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 62.
144. Grenada Report, supra note 122, at 363.
145. See DOP, supra note 6, at pmbl.
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questions whether the PLO still "represents" the Palestinians.
PLO representation of Palestinians appears to have constituted "an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
treaty." Thus, its absence could lay the groundwork for the
agreement's termination. 46
D. Consequences of an Israeli Termination of the DOP
An Israeli government repudiation of the DOP would raise
nettlesome issues concerning the fate of concessions granted and
rights accruing to the PLO since the DOP's execution. Most
conspicuous among these are withdrawal of Israeli forces from the
Gaza Strip and Jericho, deployment of thousands of armed
Palestinian police there, and creation of a Palestinian Authority
with limited self-rule.
With respect to binding international agreements, a termina-
tion "does not affect the validity of rights acquired in consequence
of the performance of obligations stipulated in the treaty.'
' 47
Based on this rule, at least one commentator argues that the DOP
has already created a Palestinian entity with defined borders and
jurisdiction, and that terminating the agreement would nonetheless
146. As discussed above, Israel may have been aware that Arafat's power was in
decline at the time the parties executed the DOP, a fact militating against applying the
doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances. Israel, however, appears to have
believed that, either because of benefits flowing from the execution of the DOP, or based
on Arafat's strong arm tactics, the PLO would be able to control the Palestinians in.its
areas. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
147. McNAIR, supra note 132, at 532. According to McNair:
It is an accepted rule of treaty law that the termination of a treaty, for whatever
cause and in whatever way, can only affect its continuing obligations, and cannot
per se affect or prejudice any right already definitively and finally acquired under
it, or reverse anything effected by any clause of an executed character in the
treaty. Thus, a payment made under the treaty does not become repayable; a
settlement of a dispute effected by a treaty does not become reopened because
the treaty terminates or is denounced; demarcated frontiers are not rendered
indeterminate; cessions of territory are not canceled, etc.
Id. The Vienna Convention provides expressly for the preservation of rights already
created under a terminated bilateral treaty:
1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the
termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present
Convention:
(a) releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty;
(b) does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created
through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.
Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 70.
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leave intact the new geopolitical unit.148  This proposition,
however, appears to go too far. For example, while Israel has
redeployed troops outside the autonomous areas, permanent
arrangements following a five-year transitional period shall
determine the final status of those areas.149 Thus, Israel's initial
deployment does not predestine those autonomous areas' transfer
to the Palestinians, nor even Israel's permanent exclusion from
them. Indeed, the DOP provides expressly that "the outcome of
the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or
preempted by agreements reached for the interim period."15
The DOP appears to contemplate that Palestinian autonomy
will survive the permanent status negotiations."' Nevertheless,
an Israeli termination might leave intact fewer "rights" created for
the PLO than one might suppose. Viewing the issue from the
PLO's most favorable position, only one "right" would remain
intact. Thus, if the DOP is indeed a binding international
agreement, the probable surviving right would entail creation of
limited self-rule in Gaza and Jericho.
An actual Israeli repudiation, however, could overpower even
that straitened right of self-rule. Far from rising to the level of a
binding international agreement, the DOP, at most, carries the
lesser legal weight of an agreement to agree. As such, one could
argue that the rule regarding preservation of previously created
rights is inapplicable.
VII. CONCLUSION
Israel's perception of serious PLO violations of the DOP, and
the real possibility of political change in Israel's government,
enlarges the prospect of Israel severing its obligations under the
148. Benvenisti, supra note 73, at 545. Benvenisti relies in this regard on Article 70 of
the Vienna Convention. Id.
149. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
150. DOP, supra note 6, art. V(4).
151. See DOP, supra note 6, art. I. The DOP provides as follows:
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East
peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-
Government Authority, the elected Council, for the Palestinian people in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years,
leading to a permanent settlement based on [U.N.] Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338.
Id& Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu's proposal to freeze the peace process, but to
continue allowing limited autonomy in Jericho and the Gaza Strip, seems consistent with
this view. See supra note 2.
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DOP As a matter of international law, suspension or termination
would be within Israel's rights.
Because the PLO is not a state, and because the text of the
DOP and circumstances surrounding its execution support a claim
that the pact is nonbinding or, at most, an agreement to agree, the
DOP imposes no substantive legal obligations on Israel. Of
course, any Israeli decision to terminate the DOP would have
international political consequences, though not perhaps from its
ally, the United States, and might trigger domestic Israeli political
repercussions as well.
Even assuming the DOP is a binding international agreement,
one could still justify suspension or termination. PLO violations
have denied Israel the fundamental security benefits that were to
attend execution of the DOE Thus, the violations are material,
and justify Israeli termination or reprisals. Moreover, to the extent
the PLO no longer serves as de facto representative of the
Palestinians, a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred
since the DOP took effect. That would also justify Israeli termina-
tion.
International law, however, ultimately may exert little
influence on any forthcoming Israeli decisions on the DOP's fate.
For if a new government of Israel strongly believes its state's
welfare compels termination of the DOP, one presumes it will act
accordingly. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger may
have delineated both the extent of the state's dilemma and the
force of its resolve when he said: "Israel cannot commit suicide for
the sake of clauses in an agreement." '52
152. Kissinger Sends Message to Nobel Prize Winners, Xinhau News Agency, Dec. 9,
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